Article created and last updated on: Sunday 05 October 2025 23:58
Abstract
In the wake of the dramatic collapse of Bashar al-Assad's decades-long rule, Syria has embarked on a fragile and contentious political transition, culminating in the nation's first parliamentary elections on the 5th of October 2025. This momentous event, however, has been fraught with complexities and controversies that cast a long shadow over the nascent post-Assad era. The electoral process, a hybrid system of indirect voting through local committees and direct appointments by the interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has drawn considerable criticism for its perceived lack of democratic legitimacy. The exclusion of three provinces due to ongoing security concerns and political tensions further complicates the narrative of a unified and inclusive new Syria. This article provides a comprehensive analysis of these landmark elections, examining the intricate political landscape, the socio-economic devastation left by a protracted civil war, and the immense challenges confronting the transitional government. It delves into the legal framework of the interim constitution, the role of civil society in shaping the country's future, and the varied reactions of the international community. Through a detailed exploration of these multifaceted issues, the article illuminates the profound uncertainties and faint hopes that define Syria's journey from the ashes of dictatorship towards an undetermined future.
Key Historical Facts
- The Syrian civil war began in March 2011, sparked by protests in Deraa.
- The Assad family's iron-fisted dynasty and Ba'athist rule lasted over half a century.
- Hafez al-Assad started the Assad dynasty when he rose to power in 1970.
- The Assad regime's power base heavily relied on the Alawite minority.
- Bashar al-Assad fled the country to Russia on December 8, 2024.
Key New Facts
- Syria's first parliamentary elections since Assad's ousting were held on October 5, 2025.
- The transitional government is led by interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa.
- Three provinces, Suwayda, Raqqa, and Hasakah, were excluded from the elections.
- The electoral system used indirect voting and presidential appointment of 70 deputies.
- Syria's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has shrunk by over 85 percent since the conflict began.
Introduction
The Syrian Arab Republic stands at a pivotal and precarious crossroads in its long and tumultuous history. The first parliamentary elections since the ousting of President Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 were held on the 5th of October 2025, a development that symbolises a definitive break from over half a century of Ba'athist rule and the iron-fisted dynasty of the Assad family 6, 19. The fall of Damascus to a coalition of opposition forces marked the culmination of a brutal and protracted civil war that erupted in March 2011, a conflict that has left the nation in ruins, its society deeply fractured, and its people scattered across the globe 6, 21. The elections, therefore, represent more than just a political exercise; they are a tentative and deeply contested step towards forging a new national identity and a post-conflict political order.
The path to these elections has been anything but straightforward. The transitional government, led by interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa, has had to navigate a minefield of challenges, from a shattered economy and a humanitarian crisis of staggering proportions to deep-seated sectarian tensions and the continued presence of foreign military forces on Syrian soil 30, 38. The decision to opt for an indirect electoral system, whereby local committees select the majority of the parliamentarians, has been a major point of contention. The government has justified this approach by citing the immense logistical hurdles of holding a direct popular vote, including the displacement of millions of Syrians and the widespread loss of official documentation 3, 31. However, critics, both within Syria and internationally, have raised serious concerns about the transparency and fairness of this process, arguing that it is susceptible to manipulation and could serve to consolidate the power of the new ruling elite 11, 31.
Adding to the complexity of the situation is the exclusion of three provinces from the electoral process: the Druze-majority Suwayda in the south, and the Kurdish-controlled Raqqa and Hasakah in the northeast 2, 26. The official rationale for this decision is the prevailing insecurity and political deadlock in these regions 3, 26. This exclusion, however, has been met with condemnation from the affected communities, who see it as a deliberate act of political marginalisation that undermines the very notion of a unified and inclusive post-Assad Syria 35, 42. The new People's Assembly, therefore, convenes with a significant portion of the country unrepresented, a stark reminder of the deep divisions that continue to plague the nation.
This article will provide a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of Syria's first post-Assad parliamentary elections. It will begin by examining the historical context of the Syrian civil war and the factors that led to the dramatic collapse of the Assad regime. It will then delve into the intricacies of the transitional period, exploring the structure of the interim government, the political vision of its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and the legal framework established by the interim constitution. The core of the article will be a critical examination of the electoral process itself, including the mechanics of the indirect voting system, the controversies surrounding it, and the implications of the exclusion of the three provinces. Furthermore, the article will analyse the dire socio-economic conditions that form the backdrop to this political transition and the monumental task of reconstruction that lies ahead. The role of Syria's vibrant and resilient civil society in shaping the country's future will also be explored. Finally, the article will assess the reactions of the international community to these elections and consider the broader geopolitical implications for the Middle East. By weaving together these various threads, this article aims to provide a nuanced and comprehensive understanding of a pivotal moment in Syria's history, a moment fraught with both peril and a glimmer of hope for a more peaceful and democratic future.
The Long Road to Damascus: The Genesis and Culmination of the Syrian Civil War
The Syrian civil war, which erupted in March 2011, was not a spontaneous event but rather the culmination of decades of simmering discontent and systemic repression under the Ba'athist regime 6, 21. The initial sparks of the uprising were ignited in the southern city of Deraa, where peaceful pro-democracy protests, inspired by the wider Arab Spring, were met with a brutal and lethal response from the security forces of Bashar al-Assad 15, 25. This violent crackdown on dissent acted as a catalyst, transforming localised protests into a nationwide armed revolt that would plunge the country into a devastating and multifaceted conflict 6.
The Assad dynasty, which began with Hafez al-Assad's rise to power in 1970, had long maintained its grip on Syria through a combination of a pervasive security apparatus, the cultivation of sectarian loyalties, and the suppression of any form of political opposition 27. The regime's power base was heavily reliant on the Alawite minority, to which the Assad family belongs, leading to a system of governance that was perceived by many as exclusionary and corrupt 21. Economic grievances also played a significant role in fuelling the uprising. A severe drought from 2006 to 2010, coupled with neoliberal economic policies that benefited a small elite, had exacerbated poverty and inequality, particularly in rural areas 21.
As the conflict escalated, it drew in a complex web of regional and international actors, transforming Syria into a proxy battleground for competing geopolitical interests 21. The Assad regime received crucial military and financial support from Iran and Russia, which enabled it to withstand the initial onslaught of the rebellion and regain significant territory 12, 15. On the other side, a fragmented opposition, ranging from moderate nationalist groups to Islamist factions, received backing from a variety of countries, including Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and some Western nations 6, 21. The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014 added another brutal dimension to the conflict, as the group carved out a self-proclaimed caliphate across large swathes of Syria and Iraq, perpetrating horrific atrocities and drawing in a US-led international coalition to combat it 12.
For several years, the conflict descended into a bloody stalemate, with the country effectively partitioned into different zones of control 6, 25. The Assad regime, though weakened, managed to hold on to the major population centres in the west of the country, while various opposition groups controlled the northwest, and Kurdish-led forces, with US backing, established an autonomous administration in the northeast 25. However, the dynamics of the war began to shift dramatically in late 2024. A lightning offensive launched by a coalition of opposition forces, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), caught the Assad regime and its allies by surprise 12, 25. The rapid collapse of the Syrian Arab Army's defences in key cities like Aleppo and Homs demonstrated the hollowing out of the regime's military capabilities after years of attrition 25. On the 8th of December 2024, opposition forces entered the capital, Damascus, and Bashar al-Assad fled the country, seeking refuge in Russia 6. The fall of the Assad regime marked the end of an era and the beginning of a new, uncertain chapter in Syria's history.
The Architecture of Transition: A New Government and an Interim Constitution
In the immediate aftermath of the fall of Damascus, a caretaker government was established to prevent a complete collapse of state institutions 19. This was followed by the formation of a transitional government on the 29th of March 2025, with Ahmed al-Sharaa, the leader of HTS, at its helm as interim president 5, 40. The composition of this new government has been a subject of intense scrutiny. While it includes some technocrats, civil society leaders, and even a few former ministers from the Assad era, the most powerful ministries, such as defence, interior, and justice, are dominated by figures closely allied with HTS 5. This has raised concerns among some Syrians and international observers about the new leadership's commitment to a genuinely inclusive and pluralistic political system 39.
A key legal document shaping the transitional period is the 2025 Interim Constitution of Syria, which was ratified by President al-Sharaa on the 13th of March 2025 4. This document, which is intended to be in force for a five-year transitional period, establishes a presidential system of government, with significant executive power concentrated in the hands of the president 4, 39. The interim constitution also enshrines Islamic law as a primary source of legislation, a provision that has caused unease among Syria's diverse religious and ethnic minorities 24, 30. The document guarantees freedom of expression and the press, but these rights are qualified by the need to protect public order 29.
The interim constitution also lays the groundwork for the establishment of a provisional People's Assembly, the very body that was elected on the 5th of October 2025 3. This assembly is tasked with a range of legislative functions, including passing new laws, amending existing ones, ratifying international treaties, and approving the state budget 3. Crucially, it is also responsible for overseeing the drafting of a new, permanent constitution for the country, which will eventually be put to a national referendum 10. However, the powers of the People's Assembly are constrained by the significant authority vested in the presidency. Presidential decrees carry the force of law and can only be overturned by a two-thirds majority in the assembly, ensuring that the executive branch remains the dominant force in the transitional political structure 3.
The process of drafting the interim constitution itself has been criticised for its lack of inclusivity. A seven-member committee was appointed by President al-Sharaa to draft the document, with limited consultation with broader Syrian society 8. This top-down approach has been a recurring theme in the transitional period, leading to accusations that the new authorities are replicating some of the exclusionary practices of the former regime 33. The Kurdish-led administration in northeastern Syria, for instance, has criticised the constitutional declaration, stating that it does not reflect the diversity of the Syrian people 27. As Syria moves forward, the ability of the transitional government to broaden political participation and build a genuine national consensus around a new social and political contract will be a critical test of its legitimacy and its long-term viability.
A Contested Mandate: The Mechanics and Controversies of the 2025 Elections
The parliamentary elections of the 5th of October 2025 were conducted under a unique and highly contentious electoral system. In the absence of a direct popular vote, the majority of the 210 members of the new People's Assembly were selected through an indirect process involving local electoral colleges 3, 31. This system was designed and overseen by an 11-member Higher Committee for People's Assembly Elections, which was appointed by President al-Sharaa 32. The process began with the formation of subcommittees in each electoral district, which were then tasked with selecting the members of the electoral colleges 36. These electoral colleges, composed of between 30 and 50 members each, were then responsible for voting for the parliamentary candidates in their respective districts 36.
The transitional government has defended this indirect system as a pragmatic necessity in the face of the extraordinary challenges confronting the country 31. The displacement of an estimated 12 million Syrians, both internally and as refugees abroad, and the widespread loss of identity documents during the war, would have made the creation of an accurate voter registry and the organisation of a nationwide popular vote an almost impossible task 6, 31. Proponents of the system also argue that it allows for the selection of qualified and respected individuals from local communities, who may not have the resources to run in a national campaign 43.
However, the electoral process has been met with a chorus of criticism from a wide range of Syrian and international observers, who have questioned its democratic credentials 11, 31. A key concern has been the lack of transparency in the selection of the subcommittees and the electoral colleges 13. The criteria for selecting these bodies have been described as vague, leaving the process vulnerable to manipulation by the ruling authorities 3, 36. This has led to accusations that the system is designed to favour well-connected candidates and to ensure that the new parliament is dominated by individuals loyal to the interim government 31.
Further compounding these concerns is the fact that one-third of the members of the People's Assembly, a total of 70 deputies, were not elected at all but were directly appointed by President al-Sharaa 3, 31. This provision has been widely seen as a mechanism for the president to further consolidate his power and to ensure a compliant legislature 30. The combination of an indirect electoral system and presidential appointments has led many to conclude that the elections were more of a selection process than a genuine democratic exercise 46.
The issue of representation has also been a major point of contention. The final list of candidates for the elections showed a stark gender imbalance, with women accounting for only 14 percent of the total 47. This is despite earlier pledges from the transitional authorities to ensure greater female participation in the political process 3. The representation of Syria's diverse religious and ethnic minorities has also been a source of concern, particularly in light of the exclusion of the provinces of Suwayda, Raqqa, and Hasakah 14. While the new government has appointed some individuals from minority communities to ministerial positions, many feel that this is mere tokenism and does not address the fundamental issue of their political marginalisation 5, 14. The new People's Assembly, therefore, begins its term with a contested mandate, facing a significant legitimacy deficit in the eyes of a large segment of the Syrian population.
The Unrepresented: The Exclusion of Suwayda, Raqqa, and Hasakah
A defining and deeply problematic feature of the 2025 parliamentary elections was the indefinite postponement of voting in three provinces: the Druze-majority Suwayda, and the predominantly Kurdish-controlled Raqqa and Hasakah 2, 26. The Higher Committee for People's Assembly Elections cited "security and logistical challenges" and the fact that these areas remain outside of the central government's full control as the reasons for their exclusion 7, 26. This decision has meant that the 32 parliamentary seats allocated to these provinces will remain vacant, leaving a significant portion of the Syrian population without representation in the new legislature 11, 32.
The situation in each of these provinces is complex and reflects the fragmented nature of post-Assad Syria. In Suwayda, tensions between the local Druze community and the new authorities in Damascus have been high, particularly following deadly sectarian clashes in July 2025 26, 34. The Druze, a religious minority, have long sought to maintain a degree of autonomy and have been wary of the Islamist leanings of some of the groups that now hold power in Damascus 10. The interim government's inability to guarantee the security of the Druze community has led to a breakdown of trust and a rejection of the central government's authority in the province 26.
In the northeastern provinces of Raqqa and Hasakah, the political landscape is dominated by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which established an autonomous administration during the civil war with the support of the United States 26, 37. Negotiations between the SDF and the transitional government over the integration of their military and civilian institutions into the new Syrian state have stalled 29, 42. The SDF has been pushing for a decentralised political system that would grant them a significant degree of autonomy, a demand that has been met with resistance from Damascus, which is keen to reassert central control over the entire country 42. The exclusion of these provinces from the elections has been strongly condemned by the SDF and other local groups, who view it as a violation of the rights of the nearly five million Syrians living in these areas and a clear indication of the new government's unwillingness to accommodate their political aspirations 35.
The exclusion of these three provinces has profound implications for the future of Syria. It not only undermines the credibility of the elections and the legitimacy of the new parliament, but it also deepens the existing divisions within the country and raises the spectre of a de facto partition of Syria 6. The failure to find a political solution that addresses the grievances and aspirations of the Druze and Kurdish communities could lead to further instability and conflict, jeopardising the fragile peace that has taken hold in other parts of the country. The empty seats in the People's Assembly serve as a powerful symbol of the unresolved challenges that lie at the heart of Syria's political transition.
The Weight of War: Socio-Economic Devastation and the Herculean Task of Reconstruction
The political transition in Syria is taking place against a backdrop of almost unimaginable socio-economic devastation. The nearly 14 years of civil war have inflicted a catastrophic toll on the country's economy, infrastructure, and social fabric 9, 19. Syria's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has shrunk by over 85 percent since the start of the conflict, plummeting from $67.5 billion in 2011 to a mere $9 billion in 2023 9. The Syrian pound has experienced a staggering depreciation, losing a significant portion of its value against the US dollar and fuelling rampant hyperinflation that has eroded the purchasing power of ordinary citizens 9.
The war has left a legacy of widespread poverty and humanitarian need. According to the World Bank, an estimated 69 percent of Syrians now live in poverty, with over a quarter of the population experiencing extreme poverty, a condition that was virtually non-existent before 2011 9. The United Nations estimates that around 16.7 million people in Syria are in need of humanitarian assistance 16. Food insecurity is rampant, with nearly half the population struggling to access adequate nutrition 26. The country's infrastructure is in ruins, with cities and towns reduced to rubble, and essential services such as electricity, water, and healthcare severely disrupted 6, 25. The cost of reconstruction is estimated to be between $250 billion and $400 billion, a sum that is far beyond the capacity of the new Syrian government to finance on its own 16.
The challenges facing the transitional government in addressing this economic crisis are immense. The country's key economic sectors, such as oil production and agriculture, have been decimated by the war 9. International sanctions, imposed on the Assad regime and still largely in place, continue to hamper economic recovery by restricting access to international finance and trade 19. The new government has inherited a state that is effectively bankrupt, with foreign currency reserves depleted and a heavy reliance on external support 19.
In this context, the transitional government has begun to implement a series of economic reforms aimed at stabilising the economy and attracting foreign investment 40. These include measures to liberalise the economy, support the private sector, and reform the energy sector 40. However, some of these policies, such as the cutting of subsidies on essential goods like bread, have been met with public discontent, as they have further exacerbated the economic hardship faced by the most vulnerable segments of the population 16. The long-term success of Syria's political transition will be inextricably linked to the ability of the new government to deliver tangible improvements in the living conditions of its people. Without a significant and sustained effort to address the country's deep-seated economic problems, the fragile peace could easily unravel, plunging Syria back into a cycle of instability and conflict.
The Rise of a New Public Sphere: The Role of Civil Society
Amidst the devastation of the war and the uncertainties of the political transition, one of the most significant and hopeful developments in Syria has been the emergence of a vibrant and resilient civil society 7, 11. For decades under the Assad regime, independent civil society was systematically suppressed, with the state maintaining a tight monopoly over the public sphere 11. The 2011 uprising, however, unleashed a wave of civic activism, with new organisations and initiatives emerging both inside Syria and in the diaspora, dedicated to a wide range of causes, from humanitarian relief and human rights documentation to advocacy for democratic change 11, 20.
In the post-Assad era, these civil society organisations have a crucial role to play in shaping the future of the country 7, 23. They are seen by many as a vital counterbalance to the power of the state and a key driver of a more inclusive and participatory political process 23. Syrian civil society actors have been at the forefront of calls for a transparent and accountable transitional justice process to address the horrific crimes committed during the war 10, 20. They have also been actively involved in monitoring the political transition, advocating for the protection of human rights, and providing essential services to communities that have been devastated by the conflict 18.
However, the relationship between civil society and the new transitional government has been complex and, at times, fraught with tension. While the new authorities have expressed a commitment to engaging with civil society, many activists remain sceptical of their intentions, particularly given the dominance of HTS in the new political order 39. There are concerns that the government may seek to co-opt or control civil society organisations, rather than treating them as genuine partners in the process of state-building 11.
Despite these challenges, Syrian civil society continues to be a powerful force for positive change. Grassroots organisations are working to bridge sectarian divides and foster social cohesion at the local level, while diaspora networks are leveraging their expertise and resources to support reconstruction and development efforts 18, 23. The struggle for an independent and empowered civil society is seen as a crucial battle in the larger war for a democratic and pluralistic Syria. The extent to which these organisations are able to operate freely and to influence the political process will be a key indicator of the direction in which the country is heading.
An Onlooker's Gaze: International Reactions and Geopolitical Implications
The first post-Assad elections in Syria have been met with a mixed and cautious reaction from the international community, reflecting the complex geopolitical landscape of the Middle East and the deep divisions that have characterised the Syrian conflict from its outset 15, 30. While some countries have welcomed the elections as a necessary step towards political normalisation, others have expressed serious reservations about their legitimacy and the implications for the future of the country 14, 34.
The United States and its European allies have adopted a stance of conditional engagement with the new Syrian government 17, 37. They have acknowledged the fall of the Assad regime as a positive development but have been hesitant to lift the extensive sanctions that were imposed on the country during the war 17, 24. Washington has laid out a series of conditions for the full normalisation of relations, including the formation of an inclusive government, the protection of minority rights, and verifiable steps to dismantle the former regime's chemical weapons programme 17, 36. The US also maintains a military presence in northeastern Syria in support of its Kurdish allies, a situation that remains a major point of contention with the new government in Damascus 28, 37.
Regional powers have also been closely watching the developments in Syria, each with their own set of interests and concerns. Turkey, which has long been a major backer of the Syrian opposition, has welcomed the fall of Assad but remains wary of the growing influence of Kurdish groups along its southern border 37, 45. Ankara has maintained its military presence in northern Syria and has expressed its opposition to any moves towards Kurdish autonomy 37. The Gulf Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, who were also key supporters of the opposition, have cautiously re-engaged with Damascus, seeing an opportunity to counter the influence of their regional rival, Iran 2, 30.
Russia and Iran, the main international backers of the Assad regime, have been forced to recalibrate their policies in the wake of their ally's downfall 30. While they have lost a key strategic partner, both countries retain a significant presence in Syria and will seek to protect their interests in the new political order 30. Israel, which has long been concerned about the presence of Iranian-backed forces in Syria, has taken advantage of the power vacuum to step up its military strikes against targets in the country and has occupied formerly demilitarised zones along the border 10, 37.
The geopolitical implications of the transition in Syria are profound. The country's future trajectory will have a significant impact on the regional balance of power, the fight against terrorism, and the ongoing refugee crisis. The ability of the new Syrian government to navigate these complex external pressures and to forge a foreign policy that serves the interests of the Syrian people will be a critical determinant of its success. The international community, for its part, faces the challenge of striking a balance between supporting a peaceful and democratic transition in Syria and protecting its own strategic interests in a volatile and unpredictable region.
Conclusion
The 5th of October 2025 will be remembered as a landmark date in the annals of Syrian history. The first parliamentary elections in the post-Assad era, however flawed and contested, represent a symbolic turning of the page on a dark and bloody chapter. Yet, as the dust settles on this momentous event, it is clear that the path ahead for Syria is fraught with immense challenges and profound uncertainties. The nation stands at a critical juncture, teetering between the hope of a new beginning and the ever-present danger of a relapse into chaos and conflict.
The elections have laid bare the deep divisions that continue to plague Syrian society. The indirect and exclusionary nature of the electoral process has failed to generate a broad-based national consensus, and the new People's Assembly begins its term with a significant legitimacy deficit. The exclusion of Suwayda, Raqqa, and Hasakah is a particularly ominous sign, highlighting the urgent need for a more inclusive political settlement that can address the legitimate grievances and aspirations of all of Syria's diverse communities. Without a genuine process of national reconciliation and a commitment to power-sharing, the dream of a unified and stable Syria may remain elusive.
The transitional government under the leadership of Ahmed al-Sharaa faces a Herculean task. It must not only navigate the treacherous waters of a deeply polarised political landscape but also confront a socio-economic crisis of catastrophic proportions. The reconstruction of the country, the revival of its shattered economy, and the alleviation of the suffering of its people will require a monumental effort, one that cannot succeed without significant and sustained international support. The lifting of sanctions and the provision of development aid will be crucial in this regard, but this assistance is likely to remain conditional on the new government's commitment to a more inclusive and democratic path.
In this context, the role of Syrian civil society will be more important than ever. These organisations, which have demonstrated remarkable resilience and courage throughout the years of conflict, have the potential to be a powerful engine for positive change, advocating for human rights, promoting social cohesion, and holding the new authorities to account. The extent to which they are allowed to operate freely and to participate meaningfully in the political process will be a key litmus test of the new Syria's democratic credentials.
The international community also has a critical role to play. A coordinated and principled approach is needed, one that prioritises the interests of the Syrian people above geopolitical expediency. This will require a delicate balancing act, combining pressure on the new government to uphold its commitments to inclusivity and human rights with a willingness to provide the necessary support for the country's recovery and reconstruction.
Ultimately, the future of Syria will be determined by the Syrian people themselves. The journey from dictatorship to a stable and democratic state is a long and arduous one, and there will undoubtedly be many setbacks along the way. The elections of October 2025 were not a final destination but rather a single, faltering step on this long and uncertain road. The hope for a new dawn in Syria remains, but it is a hope that is tempered by the harsh realities of a nation that has been scarred by war and is still struggling to find its way out of the darkness.
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